In this paper, I argue that the transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology is compatible with a metaphysical realism. I not only develop an argument regarding the consistency between both philosophical stances, but I argue that this was Husserl’s own thesis. As a consequence, I support my interpretation on a hermeneutic of some of the most important texts by Husserl himself, where he deals directly with the issue.

Este artigo visa apresentar o estudo das relações de identidade no Cristianismo Antigo a partir da recepção de Elementos do Helenismo Religioso. Estas confluências, advindas anteriormente das relações com o Judaísmo da Diáspora, no Egito Ptolomaico (LXX – séc. IV a.C), são consolidadas com a formação geopolítica e religiosa da Expansão do Cristianismo na Ásia Menor, durante o IIo século. Através da exposição de ‘The Religious Context of Early Christianity’ (KLAUS, 2000) abordaremos as vicissitudes da Religião Helênica em mutação entre (...) a Filosofia da Felicidade e o Retorno do Divino Absoluto no Gnosticismo. Em diálogo com um tradicional estudo sobre a ‘atmosfera’ antiga nas relações entre a Gnose antiga, o Judaísmo e o Cristianismo (MINNERATH, 1973) serão traçadas as vias expostas pela obra de Klauck. No dizer do autor, trata-se de empreender um percurso que nos permita descortinar o ‘inteiro horizonte’ (KLAUS, 2000. p. 6) do Gnosticismo. (shrink)

Este artigo disserta, sob o ponto de vista dos estudos de ‘exegese bíblica’, sobre um antigo e intrincado conceito que foi transmitido ao Cristianismo Primitivo, no primeiro século cristão, pela tradição hebraica, através da famosa tradução da “Septuaginta”, no IV século a.C. no Egito Ptolomaico, onde vivia e rezava uma grande Comunidade Judaico-Helenista. A Verdade’ constituiu-se um conceito-chave para as experiências religiosas desde o Mito até as mais sofisticadas pretensões de revelação divina, como o Judaísmo, o Cristianismo e o Islamismo. (...) Enfocamos aqui, em particular, a proximidade semântica destes ambientes helenizados na ‘Ásia Menor’ com a terminologia utilizada nos textos das Tradições de S.Paulo e, especialmente de S.João (Evangelho e Cartas), que relacionam Cristo, Espírito e Igreja ao âmbito da ‘verdade’. (shrink)

St. Augustine doesn't see in the crisis of the Pagan City the simple occasion of revenge, but the 'kairós' of an innovation that emerges among 'debris'. Without needing from the resource to the 'Phoenix', the Christian truth of the eternity, for Christ's Resurrection, communicates to the time limited and not repeat a new horizon. This 'new times' is apt to cross the things street and mutants, and so, the own 'death of the city' does not determine more 'death of man'. (...) The inspiration of The City of God is not a political projection in the way that we know in classical grec-latin culture. In the 'De Civitate Dei', on the contrary, Saint Augustine serves the Christian faith and of the Gospel to explain this mission of the city of God peregrine in time. (shrink)

The Current research seeks the study of the identity relationships in the early Christianity starting from the reception of Elements of the Religious Hellenism. These confluences advents previously of the relationships with the Judaism of Diaspora, in Egito Ptolomaico (LXX. séc. IV a.C), they are consolidated with the formation geopolitics and religious person of the Expansion of the Christianity in Minor Asia, during IIo Century. Through the exhibition of ‘The Religious Context of Early Christianity’ (KLAUS, 2000) we will approach Hellenistic’s (...) Religion vicissitudes in mutation between the Philosophy of the Happiness and ‘the Return of the Divine Absolute’ in Gnosticism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article aims to analyze, from a Bakhtinian perspective, the grotesque construction of Mexican artist Frida Kahlo’s body through a religious worldview. Therefore, we analyze two of her self-portraits, taking into account the dialogic relations constructed between the grotesque representations and Catholic symbology. The analyzed utterances, in which the specificities of the creative competence of the author-creator in her aesthetic activity are inferred, showed that a dialogue is established between the painting El venado herido and Catholic Saint Sebastian and (...) between the painting Las dos fridas and the image of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. (shrink)

A PORTABILIDADE DOS PLANOS DE ASSISTÊNCIA PRIVADA À SAÚDE: UMA ANÁLISE SOB A PERSPECTIVA CONSUMERISTA.

En este documento, debato ampliamente sobre la fenomenología de la intersubjetividad presentada por Husserl y por Sartre, centrándome en los conceptos de empatía y ser-para-otros. Contrariamente a la opinión más común, rechazo la objeción de solipsista dirigida a Husserl y sostengo que es la descripción de Sartre la que da lugar a esa objeción, en la medida en que él describe la conciencia de otro sujeto como una forma de autoconocimiento como un "objeto" (para "otros"). Termino señalando algunas directrices para (...) convertir el análisis de Husserl de la aprehensión de otros sujetos en una fenomenología de la comunicación del más alto nivel. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine phenomenologically the structure of the normative noema, which I call the “nomothetic noema.” I distinguish the meaning content, its normative characters, which I call “ductive forces”, and its modes of givenness. Next, I introduce the traditional difference between modalities de re and de dicto. I argue that the current tendency, in deontic logic, to treat deontic expressions as operators over sentences induces, at least on the syntactic surface, a de dicto reading. I then discuss some (...) of the theoretical decisions that underlie deontic logic, starting from two basic asymmetries between modal alethic logic and deontic logic. The decisive point is to recover a strong sense of permission that I equate with the factor of free agency, which is difficult to formalize. Finally, I return to the analysis of the nomothetic noema and try to show how a de re reading is better suited to account for normative intentionality. I simultaneously introduce the concept of status-imposing norms, which must be formulated with a normative use of the copulas “is” and “has.” I conclude that the treatment of normative expressions is more appropriate when they are understood as complex copulas, irreducible to assertive sentences, rather than as operators over whole sentences. I emphasize on this occasion that, from a phenomenological point of view and within the framework of genetic analysis, the primitive basic datum is the freedom of agency, on which the normative domain of assigning statuses to agents, obligations, and prohibitions is built. (shrink)

O Correio Interceptado, que se compõe de 63 Cartas, fornece ao longo dos seus textos exemplos vários sobre o modo de estar em política. Aí são examinados com crítica espirituosa e intransigente diversos actos do poder político em exercício e tratam-se muitos assuntos de interesse para a história contemporânea. O modelo do periodismo da emigração londrina abriu a via, o arquétipo está agora instalado e projecta-se na produção dos periódicos deste período. Da autoria de José Ferreira Borges, emigrado em Londres, (...) ao mesmo tempo que outros, como Simões Margiochi e Ferreira de Moura, estas Cartas merecem, no campo da crítica da política e no quadro do novo paradigma comunicacional, a maior atenção. (shrink)

Num século "ideofágico" e "mitofágico", em que "desconhecidos" agitadores, anti-escolásticos e defensores de ideais subversores, aparentemente não coniventes com o poder, lançam a discussão no seio do Estado e da Sociedade e tentam o centro, o meio-termo, à boa maneira de um eclectismo pontual que não esquece a visão conservadora, mas mantendo-se abertos às inova­ções, o pombalismo aparenta-se a um marco miliário que apresenta características transforma­cionais e, muitas vezes, polémicas ao nível das várias esferas, como a literária, por vezes mora­lizadora (...) e costumeira, a científica ou a técnica. Esta breve alusão conjuntural encaminha-nos ao Marquês de Pombal e às mudanças de paradigma em que se envolve, e assegura, enquanto protagonista do poder que contribui, nesta ambiência, para a abertura a várias transmutações, numa espécie de inter-comunicabilidade entre paradigmas. É sob este ponto de vista da mu­dança, que o inquérito pombalino, só por si inovador, mandado realizar, após o terramoto de 1755, nos envia, para lá da ruptura técnico-científica que em si encerra, para o sistematizado aparecer de um novo conceito de temporalidade, no mínimo de outra medição do tempo, que devendo ser olhado na perspectiva social, económica, política e cultural, merece, sobretudo, ser visto sob o ângulo em apreço neste trabalho, isto é, no de um outro tempo que se aproxima. (shrink)

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting (...) from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time. (shrink)

In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not (...) on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe it as something like a perception, showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights. (shrink)

Num tempo em que os média, assoalhados pelas novas tecnologias, começam a deixar de cumprir a sua função mediadora e de teatro das operações sociais, tem lógica falar do esgotamento da utopia em favor da distopia. Não tem mais sentido abordar a utopia democrática, quando o poder apenas pretende garantir o lealismo do cidadão, a fidelidade acéfala no altar do politicamente correcto. O sistema categorial que caracterizava o espaço público em parte do século XX, espaço simbólico de democracia em acção, (...) perdeu toda a significação. Consumismo, fidelidade do cidadão, desempenho são as noções que agora fazem sentido e ganham significância, num mundo que caminha para a insignificância. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit wird die Selbstdarstellung der Phänomenologie als Wissenschaft der Weltkonstituierende transzendentale n Subjektivität, nach einer Erklärung über das, was wir die «Grundfrage» der Phänomenologie nennen, betrachtet. Diese Grundfrage ist die thematisierung des unerklärt Voraussetzung aller philosophischer und wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis: die Vorgegebenheit einer Welt als Horizont für alle aktuelle oder mögliche Forschung. Die phänomenologischen Begriffe von «Reduktion», «Intentionalität» und «transzendentaler Subjektivität» sind dargestellt als Strecken für die Begrenzung des Feldes, in dem die Frage über die Welt nachfolgend bearbeitet und (...) systematisch beantwortet sein könnte. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London’s account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French’s interpretation of London’s thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along with the objections Otávio Bueno has brought forward. Secondly, refusing in part both French’s and Bueno’s theses for several reasons, I propose another way of reading London’s thesis in the framework of transcendental phenomenology. Namely, I put (...) London’s account of the observer against the backdrop of Husserl’s analyses of the objectifying acts and objectual constitution. Finally, I end this article with some criticisms of what seems to me the ontological indigency of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, to whose “spirit” London also belongs. (shrink)

O seguinte artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a interpretação realizada pelo filósofo e místico alemão Mestre Eckhart, das figuras de Marta e Maria no sermão de número 86 A Excelência de Marta sobre Maria. Apoiado neste sermão, faremos algumas análises filosóficas dos conceitos de vida contemplativa e vida ativa, pois compreendemos que ao realizar a interpretação da superioridade de Marta sobre Maria, Mestre Eckhart estabelece um novo paradigma interpretativo da vida contemplativa e ativa na filosofia medieval. Palavras-chaves: Mestre Eckhart. Mística. (...) Vida contemplativa. Vida ativa. Marta e Maria. (shrink)

The following article aims to present and develop Martin Heidegger's criticism of Aesthetics from the essay The Origin of the Work of Art. For Heideggerian thinking, Aesthetics, as an heir to the metaphysical paradigms, kills what is essential in the art by taking it fundamentally as an object capable of provoking and impacting the sensitivity of the contemplating subject. As will be shown Heidegger traces the origin of such a conception in the first Western philosophical systems with Plato and Aristotle, (...) and its development in the initial moments of modernity with Descartes and the other heirs of his thinking. Since we are already at the heart of historical sedimentation when conceiving works of art, it is necessary to dive into such sedimentation to develop the sleeping potentialities. This is the invitation that Heidegger offers us and that we also offer the reader here. (shrink)

This research seeks to understand the relationship between philosophy and the formation of concepts in childhood from the perspective of Matthew Lipman. As our own research in the area of philosophy of education, we pose the following question as a problem to be analyzed: how can philosophy contribute to the concept formation process in childhood according to Lipman? The development of this problem was organized in five stages. A first seeks to understand and deepen Lipman's conception of Philosophy for Children, (...) especially the idea of thinking skills and philosophical dialogue in the research community; the second stage consisted of planning philosophical practice with the children at school, in a class with 32 students from the 3rd year of elementary school in a public school in the city of Londrina / PR, in the period of one semester; the third was to carry out the classroom experience with the students and the teacher from the previous stages; the fourth step was the evaluation of the practice and the planning of the following classes after each meeting; and the fifth stage was concerned with the registration, analysis and systematization of the observed. In order to investigate the contribution of philosophy to the concept formation process in childhood, according to Lipman, part of the research methodology was qualitative, analyzing the concepts of philosophy, thinking and the research community of this philosopher. For this, his main works and those of his commentators were consulted. Action research procedures were also employed through the practice of students from Elementary School I, in order to carry out an experience of the analyzed concepts. As a result of the research, it is possible to highlight the fundamental role of Lipman’s Philosophy for Children in the formation of concepts, because, through philosophical practices, the children were more reflective in approaching concepts that in their daily lives could go unnoticed. The work of questioning and dialogue in the research community made it possible to highlight the difficulty of conceptualizing at the beginning of the work, the progress along their approach and the need to seek more in-depth answers. With that, it can be highlighted that the Philosophy classes contributed to such advances and that without them the skills would remain stagnant. This study is added to the philosophical educational movement of teaching philosophy from childhood, which is considered essential for the formation of more reasonable subjects, and most importantly, with the acquisition of skills that will facilitate life in and out of school. (shrink)

Berkeley’s general tenet about immaterialism is presented and discussed. I examined apart the several theses that concur to the immaterialist theory. After that, the general argument is presented and discussed. In particular, I stress Berkeley’s assumption that a world without matter and a world with matter would be indistinguishable from the point of view of the content of perceptions, natural science. I stress that this assumption depends on a relative account of circular motion, generating the centrifugal forces, as Newton shows (...) in his bucket experiment. In spite of the efforts by Leibniz and Huygens, such a relative account of rotational motion was never presented. So the thesis about the scientific and perceptual identity between worlds with and without matter remains a simple case of wishful thinking in need for a justification. (shrink)

En este artículo, examino algunas características importantes de las teorías de conciencia y autoconciencia de Brentano y Rosenthal. En particular, analizo la distinción entre estados mentales y estados conscientes, y la cuestión relacionada con de determinar si todos los estados mentales pueden convertirse en estados conscientes. Interpreto la teoría de Brentano como una teoría de la mente de un nivel que está de acuerdo con la fusión cartesiana entre los estados mentales y la conciencia. Argumento que los problemas que surgen (...) de la posición de Brentano son, hasta cierto punto, superados por una teoría de orden superior, de modo que la posición de Rosenthal es más precisa. Sin embargo, estoy en desacuerdo con ambos en la interpretación de la consciencia de un estado mental como autoconciencia. Desarrollo los fundamentos de una teoría basada en la primacía del organismo y su mundo vital, y de la experiencia consciente como la forma superior de la vida mental, que tiene, sin embargo, sus raíces en la compleja red de estados mentales que son no estados conscientes.In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and conscious-ness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states. (shrink)

The chapter has two parts. In the first part, I introduce a more fine-grained analysis of evaluative sentences. I distinguish between evaluations proper and directions for action with several degrees of constraint: commands, pieces of advice, suggestions, and so on. I call the latter “ductive-statements.” Thus, I affirm that the realm of morals has two branches: one relative to evaluations, which are is-sentences ranging from the several degrees between good and bad to the indifferent ; the other relative to sentences (...) having a “ductive” force that impose, with different degrees of coercion, a course of action. In the second part of the chapter, I address Searle’s famous argument concerning the derivation of ought-sentences from is-sentences. Relying on my previous distinctions, I argue that Searle’s derivation is flawed in two main points, which I present and discuss at length. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit werden die Thesen S. J. Becks über den kantischen Begriff von Ding-an-sich geprüft. Es sollen weder die zwei Doktrinen verglichen werden, noch die Punkte, in denen sie übereinstimmen, noch die Punkte, in denen sie sich voneinander entfernen. Basis-Voraussetzung ist mehr die Idee, dass es eine kantische Lehre des Ding-an-sich nicht gibt, sondern, dass es vielfältige divergente Tendenzen gibt in der Art, wie Kant das Problem bearbeitet. Die Auffassung Becks wird als ein Dialog mit denjenigen divergenten Tendenzen dargestellt, (...) die in Kants Gedanken koexistieren, und dadurch eine Reflexion, die an die eigene innere Entwicklung der kritischen Philosophie gebunden ist. Die Originalität von Becks Auffassung liegt in seiner Entscheidung eine eng idealistische Interpretation der transzendentale Philosophie zu privilegieren und - infolgedessen - die theoretischen Nichtigkeit des Begriffs des Ding-an-sich zu behaupten, wenn die systematische Darstellung der kritischen Philosophie nach seinem einzigen, voraussichtlichen Prinzip unternommen wird: das Prinzip der ursprünglichen synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption. Diese Arbeit wird in drei Teile geteilt. Im ersten Teil wird Becks These geprüft, ob in der Kritik des vorliegenden Begriffs des Ding-an-sich eine Bewilligung Kants an dem Dogmatismus liegt, die durch didaktische und pädagogische Gründe determiniert ist. Im zweiten Teil werden die Übe rprüfungen, die von der systematischen Darstellung der kritischen Philosophie bei den Doktrinen der transzendentalen ästhetik, der transzendentalen Analytik und dem Schematismus gemacht werden müssen, gezeigt, so wie die nachfolgenden änderungen vom Sinn der Affektion, Synthese und Subsumption. Letztlich, im dritten Teil wird dargelegt, dass die Entscheidung Becks für den Idealismus mit einigen Punkten von Kants Denken nicht übereinstimmt und deswegen von ihm abgelehnt werden müsste. (shrink)

En partant des derniers paragraphes de la cinquième parti du Discours de la Méthode, on a reconstitué la formulation cartésienne de la perception d’un autre moi. Les critères de l’usage du langage et de la plasticité du comportement ont été analysés à la lumière de l’idée d’une machine universelle et du test de Turing. On conclut de la faiblesse de l’argument cartésien sur l’irréductibilité de la pensée à un dispositif machinal. En tant qu’issue de la difficulté, on propose une révision (...) de la façon cartésienne de caractérisation de la pensée à partir du concept d’expérience, tout en abandonnant le thème d’une perception interne incommunicable et intémoignable. (shrink)

Dans un contrepoint polémique au livre de A. Damásio, L'Erreur de Descartes, nous soutenons: que la thèse de l a «séparation» de l’âme et du corps permet, dans les écrits physiologiques de Descartes tels que le Traité de l'Homme, une réduction des fonctions végétative et sensitive aux processus mécaniques et naturels du corps humain; que l'in troduction d'une âme dans le corps se justifie, chez Descartes, par l'impossibilité de rendre raison de la rationalité du comportement humain et de la conscience (...) par les simples mécanismes physiologiques et la seule «disposition des organes». On montre, donc, que Descartes est, d'un côté, un des père s de la moderne approche neurologique qui est à l a base du livre de M. Damásio et, de l'autre, qu'il a vu d'avance une des limites d'une explication exclusivement neurologique de la complexité du comportement humain. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and consciousness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed (...) by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states. (shrink)

Fábio Alves dos Santos (1954-2013) cursou Pedagogia, Ciências Sociais e Teologia, era Especialista em Filosofia da Religião (PUC Minas), Advogado (PUC Minas) e Mestre em Direito Constitucional (UFMG). Lecionou na PUC Minas como professor de Cultura Religiosa e depois como professor no Curso de Direito, atuando principalmente no Serviço de Assistência Judiciária – SAJ, especialmente cuidado de causas populares como as da ASMARE (Associação dos Catadores de Papel, Papelão e Material Reaproveitável de Belo Horizonte), da Pastoral de Rua, (...) da Pastoral Carcerária, de movimentos de “Sem Casa”, de ocupações e tantos outros grupos. Fábio sofria de grave problema de visão há mais de 15 anos. Quase ficou cego depois de diversas cirurgias de miopia. Isso, porém, não o impedia de seguir seu constante compromisso com as lutas populares. Na última entrevista que concedeu, menos de um mês antes de sua morte (19 de outubro de 2013), depois de duro sofrimento de quase dois anos, no tratamento de um câncer no pâncreas, conta um pouco de sua vida, sua luta e sua percepção de várias realidades, especialmente da Igreja e da pastoral. Militante formado na Teologia da Libertação, de profunda espiritualidade, marcada por traços da religiosidade popular nordestina e comprometida com a libertação, Fábio Alves também buscou em sua vida abrir-se à teologia do pluralismo religioso, especialmente com o Santo Daime, em cuja tradição religiosa chegou a ser “fardado”, mantendo uma profunda atitude espiritual aberta ao diálogo inter-religioso. Sua primeira publicação foi “Começo de mundo novo: sofrimento, luta e vitória dos posseiros de Santana dos Frades”, Sergipe, numa versão popular em 1981 e outra pela Editora Vozes (1990). Fruto de sua dissertação de mestrado, publicou o livro “Direito Agrário: política fundiária no Brasil (1995). Em 2001 saiu seu último livro, uma coletânea de artigos publicados em diversos jornais: “Em defesa da vida”. Num artigo em Horizonte (2004), juntamente com o advogado, amigo e colega Prof. Cristiano de Melo Bastos, discutiu “A prática jurídica na missão da PUC Minas”. Palavras-chave : Teologia da Libertação. Militância. Igreja Católica. Pastoral. Lutas populares. (shrink)

Tomás de Aquino defende que a alma e as partes corpóreas humanas são subsistentes por si, levando a duas dificuldades. Primeiro, algo é classificado como subsistente por si quando não existe enquanto parte constituinte de uma substância. Assim, a subsistência por si refere-se às substâncias e não às suas partes. Segundo, Tomás defende que a subsistência por si da alma humana permite inferir a sua incorruptibilidade, mas que a subsistência por si das partes corpóreas não permite semelhante conclusão. Assim, dever-se-ia (...) distinguir os significados de ‘subsistência por si’ quando aplicada à alma humana e às partes corpóreas. O presente artigo, portanto, discute estes problemas mediante duas perguntas: (1) Pode-se atribuir a subsistência por si às partes de umasubstância? (2) Há diferença no significado da noção de subsistência por si quando aplicada à alma humana e às partes corpóreas? (shrink)

Tomás de Aquino define a alma humana de maneira semelhante a Aristóteles: ela é a forma substancial do corpo humano potencialmente vivo. Todavia, um dos problemas da psicologia tomista consiste, de acordo com D. Abel, em classificar a alma humana por meio de termos comumente utilizados para nomear os compostos hilemórficos, a saber, substância e hoc aliquid. Se a alma humana é parte de um composto, como poderia ser chamada de substância e de hoc aliquid? O objetivo deste artigo consiste (...) em mostrar qual é a estratégia subjacente a esta classificação utilizada por Tomás. Sugerimos que ela remonta a Aristóteles quando ele atribui diferentes significados aos termos substância e hoc aliquid. A novidade de Tomás está em expandir este campo semântico, introduzindo um significado que se aplica exclusivamente à alma humana, a saber, o sentido peculiar. (shrink)